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THE ECLECTIC TENDENCY IN ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

Among the distinctive characteristics attributed to Islamic philosophy is that it is a philosophy based upon a central problem, namely the eclectic tendency in various philosophical theses. Al-Kindi worked on reconciliation between transmitted tradition and reason; al-Farabi was keen to create a concordance between the two sages; Ibn Sina, Ibn Tufayl, and Ibn Bajja employed the art of narrative to highlight the complementary relationship between wisdom and Sharia; just as Ibn Rushd addressed in his work *Fasl al-Maqal* the nature of the relationship between wisdom and Sharia.

This prominent presence of this tendency raises a problematic that investigates the causes and dimensions which used to push each philosopher to resort to this method while addressing the various philosophical issues raised by the cultural, intellectual, and social change.

It is as if this permanent presence carries an insistence and affirmation on the part of the philosophers concerning the infinity of philosophical solutions to the proposed questions, and concerning the argumentative nature of philosophical discourse and the efficacy of the eclectic tendency in the production of ideas and the transformation of mentalities.

In light of this situation, this topic was proposed in order to determine the causes and dimensions that made the eclectic tendency present in the various intellectual and historical stations of Islamic philosophy, taking Abu Nasr al-Farabi and Ibn Rushd as an intellectual model to examine and explore the hidden aspects and horizons of this philosophical tendency, which some consider an intellectual regression and an inability to possess an authentic philosophy independent from other philosophies.

KEYWORDS

Ibn Rushd, eclectic tendency, jurisprudence (fiqh), fiqh of difference, al-Farabi, the Virtuous City

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Study Problem:

What is the nature of the causes that pushed the philosophers to adopt this tendency in their philosophical problematizations? Can it be said that it is a kind of flight forward and a lack of intellectual courage and fear of causing a philosophical shock in the social and intellectual milieu? Or is it a flexible solution capable of enabling philosophers to invest all that is intellectually available – internal intellectual production, the imported (thought), religion – and to carve out a decent place for philosophy?

And does the eclectic tendency in Ibn Rushd reflect a loss of ability to create an authentic philosophical discourse separate from fascination and imitation and from imitating the problematizations of the imported philosophical legacy? What are the reasons upon which the eclectic tendency is founded according to Ibn Rushd?

Introduction:

When referring to the studies that work on Islamic philosophy, whether Orientalist studies or Arab-Islamic ones, we find a kind of agreement on the predominance of the eclectic tendency among the pioneers of this philosophy. This tendency appears clearly at the Second Teacher, Abu Nasr al-Farabi, then at the Chief Master Ibn Sina, as well as at the philosopher of Cordoba Ibn Rushd, even though the fields and directions of eclecticism differ from one philosopher to another. This intellectual tendency which needs to determine its value and its impact on the founding of consciousness and the spirit of philosophizing in the era of these philosophers, and then to identify the causes and dimensions that pushed them to adopt this intellectual tendency and the fields in which it was employed.

And what necessitates (investigation) for Muslim philosophers from the beginning is the unsettling of the question of the motive and the impetus for the purpose of rooting the true beginnings of the birth of the idea of collection and eclecticism. Toward asking whether the eclectic tendency in Islamic philosophy is an indicator of the absence of the ability to create an authentic philosophical discourse far from emotional thought linked to fabricated crises due to the Greek import, or is it a choice and philosophical tendency adopted by these philosophers for the purpose of naturalizing Greek philosophy and affirming its status and civilizational value without that being at the expense of the status of religion and authentic intellectual and scientific production?

There is not one single and final position on this problem. For some see that the attempts of eclecticism between philosophy and religion are unsound (Helmi, 2005, p. 177), and that is due to the real causes that pushed them to adopt this tendency, whether efficient or final causes.

1. The Motive and the Necessitation for Eclectic Philosophy:

a. Islamic Philosophical Thought and the Intruding Rational Import: Its direct necessitation is excessive influence by Greek philosophy, to the point of considering it the sole carrier of truth and the optimal path to possessing it, because it makes the human intellect its main means, which is what gives man the status and center in the founding of life, and from it the confirmation of the possibility of his self-sufficiency or his not needing another source or reference to solve man's cognitive and social as well as spiritual problems. This tendency distanced its adherents and what they produced of philosophy far away from the reality and concerns of the civilizational milieu to which they belong. As Professor Ahmad Amin (1886 CE/1956 CE) says: "I see that the philosophers did not touch the real life of the Muslims, and they were in their Greek philosophy like the Greek Gnosticism in Islamic lands, not touching the interests of the nation in which they reside except when contradicted with its interest" (Amin, 1936, p. 204). And from it eclecticism became merely a means they fabricated for the purpose of opening doors to the Greek import, which is a mixture of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Plotinian philosophy, even if that was at the expense of the status and role of religion in understanding life and legislating for it. Other directions go to presenting readings in which there is scrutiny and consideration that refer it to a logical viewpoint more deserving of support than refutation, as indicated by Ernest Renan in his book *Ibn Rushd and Averroism* when he demonstrated the cumulative-integrative character of the philosophy of method according to Ibn Rushd, considering it not limited to the Arab cultural heritage. For he says: "Whoever hears the name of Ibn Rushd mentioned in the history of philosophy without interruption goes to count him among the great founders of methods who gather a large group of thinkers around an original doctrine. The reality is that expanding the scope of research in Arabic philosophy leads to a strange result in its appearance, saying that the approach known in the Middle Ages and in the Renaissance under the name of Averroism is only a kind of false interpretation" (Renan, 1957, p. 105).

Then, among those who cast doubt on the doctrinal belonging of the philosophers who adopted this tendency, given their explicit positions on some issues that came in the Qur'an and the foundation of faith and the doctrine of monotheism, such as the issue of the immortality of the soul and spiritual versus bodily resurrection. For they affirmed spiritual resurrection and denied bodily resurrection, which contradicts what came in religion and what the Qur'an and Sunnah explicitly stated. This position appeared clearly in both al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, whom Mahmoud Qasim considers "one of the figures of the populist scheme, who gathered the haters of Islam from the Magians, Jews, and heretics, and that the beginning of the implementation of this scheme goes back to the events that were stirred up in the first century of religious and political problems. The first of them relates to raising questions about predestination and decree, anthropomorphism, embodiment, and esoteric interpretation of Qur'anic verses for the purpose of distorting it and abrogating the Sharia of Islam. The second, the political one, was carried under the banner of Abdullah ibn Saba' and his followers to spread division among Muslims. And from it the role played by Ibn Sina was to contribute to the spread of that populist movement in the Islamic world under the guise of Greek philosophy" (Qasim, 1970, p. 218).

It is superfluous to state for scholars of Muslim philosophies that the eclectic tendency adopted by Muslim philosophers did not aim to affirm the centrality of religion in understanding life and legislating for it, nor to prove the power of the Sharia and its role in encouraging the human intellect to contemplate and found human happiness. Rather, the dictates of the purposive motive were determined by the idea of the eclectic tendency through the interpolation of the Greek import and opening all doors to it, so that fear of it would disappear, and receiving it, embracing it, and reaching with it to a rank where it becomes the primary source for founding thought and culture. Likewise, among its intended purposes was controlling the nature of the philosophical problematizations that should be attended to. Thus the logic of the novel rational approach becomes clear in the various theses addressed by each of al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Rushd, such as the question of the pre-eternity of the world and creation from nothing, the theory of emanation, and other questions that were raised laden with disputes and inter-sectional debates between the sects and the philosophers.

But however complex those questions were, Islamic philosophical rationality underwent the most important decisive experiments regarding the approaches of intellect and tradition. And we may retain their historical uniqueness in clarifying the inputs of the question, which no non-Arab thought has addressed with the sight and depth of interpretation and hermeneutics as Islamic philosophy has addressed it starting from the medieval ages.

In order to address this problem, we will take Ibn Rushd as a model for study, because he came after the critical movement launched by many thinkers who have their status in the history of Islamic thought. Yet despite that, he left a philosophical production in which the eclectic tendency is strongly present. So what are the reasons upon which this tendency is founded according to Ibn Rushd?

b. Summary of the Logic of Eclecticism between Intellect and Tradition: When speaking about the philosophy of collection between the two sages, or about the philosophy of collection, this does not necessarily mean that this intellectual tendency is confined only to Ibn Rushd. Rather, collection is an intellectual tradition or a methodological way that became common to resort to in the history of philosophical thought among the Greeks, as well as the Muslim philosophers like al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, and even among the scholars of Islamic jurisprudence (fuqaha'), who were seeking through their collection between opposing positions to search for the hidden aspects of jurisprudential agreement, as well as to avoid excluding any position from the field of truth and correctness, or to dismiss the legislative capacity of any opinion due to their conviction of the coherence of each opinion.

And the requirement of the situation becomes clear in the body of the article, for we think well of our philosopher Ibn Rushd and his contemporaries among the philosophers of Islam, and we do not attribute to them the characteristic of intellectual innovation in terms of intellectual and methodological referential rooting. Nevertheless, from it one can say that Ibn Rushd and other philosophers did not come with a strange intellectual innovation in terms of principle or purpose and method. He only differs from the jurists in his collection between the two sages in his book *The Necessary in Politics* or between the jurisprudential schools in his book *Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid* or between Sharia and wisdom in his book *Fasl al-Maqal fima bayn al-Sharia wa al-Hikma min al-Ittisal*, where he was keen to produce a philosophical discourse in the philosophy of jurisprudence and politics in which he affirms the existence of difference and the soundness of this phenomenon and opens wide the horizon of agreement within this reality. And this is contrary to what Abu Nasr al-Farabi did, who did not preserve the contradiction and difference between them as their writings

demonstrate. Rather, he worked on refuting the people of his time in order to collect between the two sages based on an intellectual text outside the texts of the two sages, for he employed a third text to collect – to reconcile – between the two sages and to bring together two contradictory texts to show their sharing in one single goal.

For al-Farabi collected between Plato and Aristotle based on a book considered in the history of philosophy an apocryphal book, (which book?) But his firm belief in the unity of truth as well as the preoccupation of the philosophers of his era with highlighting the contradiction between the two sages, pushed him to search for one theoretical support for the two poles of wisdom in his era. And the book *Theologia* assisted him in achieving his philosophical purposes (Abid al-Jabiri, *We and the Heritage*, 81, 82). For he says in that: "For I saw most of the people of our time having quarreled and disputed and claimed that there is a difference between the two prominent distinguished sages... I wanted in this article of mine to begin the collection between their two opinions and to clarify what the content of their two sayings indicates, so that the agreement between what they used to believe appears, and doubt and suspicion disappear from the hearts of those looking into their books, and to show the places of conjectures and the entrances of doubts in their articles. Because that is among the most important of what is intended to be clarified and the most beneficial of what is desired to be explained and illuminated" (*The Book of the Collection between the Opinions of the Two Sages*, Dar al-Mashriq, 1990, p. 79).

But it should be noted that this collection between Plato and Aristotle is not new to Islamic philosophical culture. Rather, it is a doctrine among the doctrines known to the Alexandrian philosophical tradition. For Simplicius says in his book on Aristotle's *Categories*: "If disagreement appears between Aristotle and Plato, the rule is that we should not stop at the apparent meaning nor believe that there is truly disagreement between Aristotle and Plato. Rather, you should investigate their meaning, and you will find them inevitably in agreement" (Santalla, 1981, p. 88-89) (David Santillana, *Greek Philosophical Doctrines in the Islamic World*, investigation and introduction by Muhammad Jalal Sharaf, Dar al-Nahda al-Arabiyya, 1981, p. 88, 89).

And from it, it can be said that the eclectic tendency is a philosophical orientation imposed by the intellectual context of its era, due to its implications for the unity of truth as well as the ability of philosophers and philosophy to facilitate the path for man in general and for the Muslim in particular to reach a clear vision of existence, as well as in deciding the civilizational and scientific value of the imported philosophical heritage and the necessity of investing it despite its diversity for the purpose of founding comprehensive philosophical theses about the world.

2. The Averroist Eclectic Foundations: (The Fields of Collection according to Ibn Rushd):

Introduction: At the beginning of our brief readings on the topic of our research, we will focus on the most important eclectic foundations that Ibn Rushd took as a necessary reference to establish the rational logical understanding of his eclectic approaches between the basic requirements of collection, such as (between – in this intervention of ours we will try to expand in the field of) jurisprudence (*fiqh*), the science of jurisprudence, and the principles of jurisprudence. This field which appears on its surface far away from classical philosophical investigations – existence, knowledge, values – which Greek philosophy was previously renowned for, as well as in our contemporary era. It is a field of horizons and legislation. And this is to show the extent to which the philosopher of Cordoba engaged with the present and with the cultural, scientific, and social problems which deciding them would contribute to creating an intellectual-cultural stability that contributes to founding a culture of difference and intellectual and doctrinal coexistence, and at the same time affirms the centrality of religion as a legislative and scientific reference, and the science of jurisprudence as a philosophy and as a human logic capable of producing the norms that can build the Virtuous City, in which human happiness is achieved.

2.1 The Jurisprudential Rooting according to Ibn Rushd the Jurist:

2.1.1 The Difference between the Schools:

Despite the presence of the purposes of jurisprudence (maqasid) in the science of jurisprudence and the science of the principles of jurisprudence among the scholars and the founders of the schools, that did not prevent the appearance of divergence and difference. And this difference goes back to *ijtihad* in understanding and reading the text, either by way of expansion and going beyond the apparent to the inner, or by adhering to the apparent and refusing to depart from it, or by sticking to the text or distancing from it by giving more freedom to the intellect in founding rulings and establishing the principles that can be referred back to in jurisprudence:

The literalist direction (al-dhahiriyya): It does not concern itself with meanings, but rather limits itself to the apparent meanings of texts. And they restrict the places of knowledge of the purposes of the Lawgiver to the apparent meanings and texts.

The second direction: It is a direction that sees that the purpose of the Lawgiver is not in the apparent meanings, and this extends throughout the entire Sharia, so it does not become clear in an apparent adherence. These are the esotericists (al-batiniyya). And attached to these are those who become excessive in seeking meaning to the point that if texts contradict the theoretical meaning, they are discarded.

Alongside these two directions, there is a third direction whose adherents reconcile between the apparent and the inner such that the meaning is not harmed by the text nor the text by the meaning; so that the Sharia runs upon one single system in which there is no difference and no contradiction. And this is the direction followed by most of the firmly rooted scholars, and it is the acceptable and optimal orientation according to Imam al-Shatibi.

2.1.2 The Position of Ibn Rushd regarding this Situation (Ibn Rushd's Elucidation of the Problematics of Method): Ibn Rushd's intervention in the problematic of method can be considered an attempt on his part to remove the ideological and doctrinal cover from truth in the various fields of knowledge, especially the sciences that have a relation with the Sharia and creed, as they are sciences connected to the intellectual and behavioral orientations of the individual within society, and they are capable of directing the individual toward a certain choice, and bringing him to position himself under the shadow of a particular group out of his belief that he is upon the truth. And upon this, he believes that resisting and rejecting everyone who disagrees with him and with the group that he supports is a sacred act in which there is the pleasure of God. And upon this basis, philosophy was rejected and its adherents were accused of unbelief, just as Sufism was fought and the sayings of some of its masters were interpreted until the accusation of heresy and unbelief was attached to them, and the rulings of killing and exile were executed upon them.

Ibn Rushd realized the importance of the independence of thought and its not being subjected to any spiritual or intellectual guardianship. And he also realized the danger of the existence of the ideological cover that seeks legitimacy to justify its positions opposing intellectual, doctrinal, and political freedom. And for this, he came with his epistemological project that makes the intellect a basic instrument and the way of demonstration a curriculum in any action, including the sciences of the Sharia which are no less important than other sciences.

*And the Averroist theory of concord is also viewed in its methodological context, which reinforces the systematic identity between the requirement of investigation by the intellect in intelligibles and the requirement of investigation by the intellect in transmitted matters. And in both cases, it is an affirmation of the obligation to employ the intellect in the issues and questions of religion and the world. And Ibn Rushd demonstrated in whatever chapter of his epistemological theories the logical conciliatory character, which legislates for his totalizing tendency connected to his various analyses, interpretations, and explanations regarding investigations that necessitate it. And among what demonstrates the soundness of Ibn Rushd's presentation of the conciliatory philosophy of method between philosophy and Sharia is his saying: "And when all this is established, and we, the community of Muslims, believe that this divine Sharia of ours is the truth, and that it is the one that alerted to this happiness and called to it, which is knowledge of God (Mighty and Majestic) and of His creatures, then that is established for every Muslim from the way that his constitution and nature necessitate of affirmation. That is because the natures of people are differentiated in affirmation: among them are those who affirm by demonstration, and among them are those who affirm by dialectical sayings with the affirmation of the possessor of demonstration by demonstration, as there is not in his nature more than that, and among them are those who affirm by rhetorical sayings like the affirmation of the possessor of demonstration by demonstrative sayings" (Rushd, *The Book of Fasl al-Maqal and the Determination of the Connection between Sharia and Wisdom*, 1986, p. 34).*

And from the abundant fortune of Ibn Rushd in his time was that the jurisprudential schools spreaded in it, which turned into jurisprudential schools having their principles that they rely upon in legislation. And this difference goes back to: "As for the causes of difference by kind, they are six:

- The first of them: the hesitation of words among these four ways, meaning between the word being general with the particular intended, or particular with the general intended, or general with the general intended, or particular with the particular intended, or it having an implied evidence or not having it.

- The second: the homonymy in words, and that is either in the single word like the word *qur'* which applies to purities and to menstruation, and likewise the command word whether it indicates obligation or recommendation, and the prohibition word whether it indicates forbiddance or dislike. As for the compound

word, such as His saying the Exalted: 'Except those who repent,' it is possible that it refers only to the immoral person and possible that it refers to the immoral person and the witness, so that repentance would be removing immorality and permitting the testimony of the slanderer.

- The third: difference in grammatical inflection.

- The fourth: the hesitation of the word between being taken literally or being taken as a kind of figurative speech, which is either deletion, or addition, or preposing, or postposing, or its hesitation between literal meaning or metaphor.

- The fifth: the word being absolute sometimes and restricted sometimes, like the absolute 'neck' in manumission and its restriction by faith sometimes.

- The sixth: the contradiction between two things in all categories of words by which the Sharia receives rulings from us, some of them with others, and likewise the contradiction that comes in actions, or in acknowledgements, or the contradiction of analogies themselves, or the contradiction that is composed of these three categories, meaning the opposition of saying to action, or to acknowledgement, or to analogy, and the opposition of action to acknowledgement, or to analogy, and the opposition of acknowledgement to analogy" (Rushd, *Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid*, 1998, pp. 05-06).

And these are causes that show his position regarding the difference present in the science of jurisprudence and the science of the principles of jurisprudence, as he considers it a healthy condition, when it is founded upon demonstrative justifications related to understanding the signification of the legal term – Qur'an and Sunnah – which carries several meanings from which legal rulings can be deduced. This understanding which helps to supply the scholar with the science of disputed matters. This position in which it appears that Ibn Rushd does not seek to undermine the space of difference among scholars within the same school or between different schools, due to his realization of the importance of difference and the importance of the science of difference in creating a jurisprudential intellect open to different schools, while leaving a space for transcendence if the matter necessitates that.

This rationality which distinguished Ibn Rushd made him a Maliki in school; and an encyclopedic scholar, encompassing or a mujtahid in encompassing the principles of other schools and the hidden aspects of difference between them and the causes or justifications of that difference without being an anomalous case that rejects diversity and difference. And this appears in his work *Bidayat al-Mujtahid* where he used to present, in every issue of jurisprudence, the similar opinions but especially the dissenting and exemplary preponderant opinions of all the Sunni schools. And that is for the purpose of reaching and finding a valid and acceptable explanation for this difference, by studying the methods of deducing solutions from their legislative sources. And with this he proceeds from an epistemological premise strongly present among the philosophers and thinkers of the era who affirm the complementarity of human knowledge even if its methods are multiple. And it consists in the removal of constraint from the openness of rationality, as a practical practice, to the various other cognitive systems and taking from them when scientific and practical necessity requires that, due to the encyclopedicism of what verifies rationality and its flexibility, its ability to evolve and adapt. And this is a proposition present with Taha Abd al-Rahman who acknowledges the multiplicity of rationalities and the necessity of achieving complementarity between them: "Indeed rationality, as a living practice, ought not to be restricted by the constraints of a specific logical system, even if it were comprehensive, because it will not be comprehensive enough to encompass everything that rationality revolves around" (al-Rahman, 2015, p. 148). Ibn Rushd was convinced that the strength of the method and its coherence does not necessarily mean encapsulation within this system, but rather it is obligatory to open up to other systems while encompassing their epistemological particularities, then to benefit from what they carry of cognitive principles, methodological inferential tools, and scientifically established facts. And this is the approach that he adopted in the science of legislation. With this spirit – the spirit of his era which knew a new science in jurisprudence, which is the science of disputed matters – he affirmed that difference in legislation is a healthy condition that must be preserved as an actual practical and scientific practice, because the presence of truth or the right in the various jurisprudential directions is possible. For the truth of a ruling in a specific school does not necessitate the error of the ruling given on the same question in the other school. Duplicity in truth is a scientific reality that cannot be ignored, especially since he realizes fully that human knowledge, even if it aspires to the absolute, remains relative, capable of evolution and transcendence. This conviction is found present among the scholars of Averroist thought, whether those who affirm his rationality and encyclopedicism and the strength of his cognitive project and his commitment to the method of demonstration, like Atef al-Iraqi, who praised Averroist rationality and its importance in founding free scientific truth, or the thinkers who have critical reservations about the Averroist demonstrative practice in epistemology, foremost among them the

thinker Taha Abd al-Rahman, who sees the possibility of the presence of truth in different systems even if their inferential ways are multiple: "So in everything there is a share of truth and a share of falsehood, increasing and decreasing, and this duplicity is indicated by what we witness of the change of established rulings, and what we witness of the decay of objective laws" (al-Rahman, 2015, p. 147). For Ibn Rushd was aware of this truth that accompanies human knowledge in the various investigations, whether natural, philosophical, or legal. And for this his works in the latter were distinguished by openness and the ability to absorb truth wherever it may be, even if it is present in different schools. He would strive to highlight the cognitive foundations that were relied upon in each school, to remove constraint from the diversity of truth within the unity of truth and purpose. And in this is an affirmation that Ibn Rushd was not deluded by his demonstrative rationality, but rather he was cautious of it, aware of its relativity, so that he would not fall victim to his rationality, because he who is not cautious of his intellect by his intellect may perish by his intellect* – meaning his systematicity might be a reason for his distancing from truth, which necessitates openness to the different schools even if they are multiple and differ in their rulings. And it is an openness accompanied by the preservation of the particularities of each school. *

Upon the basis of this orientation, Ibn Rushd entered the field of the science of jurisprudence and the science of the principles of jurisprudence, attempting to present his scientific thesis which would contribute, according to his view, to enriching the science of Islamic legislation. *

2.1.3 The jurisprudential theory of Ibn Rushd and his demonstrative approach:

The epistemological concern or problem related to the cognitive approach was accompanying Ibn Rushd in all fields and cognitive investigations, which he was seeing that human capability and his cognitive potentials give him the opportunity to search for truth wherever it was. He was a jurist and a philosopher, so his combining of these two qualities made him carry his methodological concerns to the world and field of jurisprudence, out of his conviction that this field cannot be established unless it was founded upon the demonstrative approach, as his loyalty to the approach made him seek help by the demonstrative approach in the field of jurisprudence to be thereby a pioneer and creative to the degree that he was able to prove his originality in his cognitive project while processing and studying various jurisprudential issues. This peculiarity manifests in his famous work (*Bidāyat al-Mujtahid wa Nihāyat al-Muqtaṣid*) as well as the book (*al-Ḍarūrī fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*) in which he was characterized by boldness in presentation and independence in building his scientific jurisprudential positions where he exceeded previous jurisprudential readings as well as the various approaches which were concerned according to his view with scientific knowledges and encompassing the jurisprudential schools and opinions without controlling the cognitive mechanism by which those rulings were deduced (Labiyou, 2001, p. 224-225).

For these reasons he was seeing that jurisprudence as a science is not classified among the theoretical sciences that aim at pure knowledge nor among the practical sciences, but rather he considers it as a law and a rule, i.e. a methodological tool aiming to establish the laws and conditions through which the mind reaches correctness (Labiyou, 2001, p. 225). He sought to make the science of principles a science that is not concerned only with cognitive production, but rather before that it is a science concerned with controlling the principles and the nature of evidences that can be relied upon and the places where these evidences are relied upon, for by possessing the mechanism of research and the controls and laws with which we search, we will realize the reasons for jurisprudential differences between the schools.

* The saying is attributed to the Sufi scholar: Imam Abu al-‘Abbas, Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Masruq al-Baghdadi, the Sheikh of Sufism. Author of the book **Siyar A‘lam al-Nubala’**, and he is the one who said: "Sufism: the emptying of secrets from what is unavoidable, and their attachment to what is indispensable." He died in Safar, the year 298 AH, and lived eighty-four years. May God have mercy on him. It has been employed with modification without violating its essential meaning, which affirms not trusting reason completely, even though the author of the saying affirms through it the importance of Sufi knowledge, which Ibn Rushd does not oppose, but rather affirms its subjectivity and the limitation of the group that utilizes it, while he is searching for knowledge available to all humanity without exception.

* This purpose emerges when looking at the titles of the works he left in this field; **Bidāyat al-Mujtahid wa Nihāyat al-Muqtaṣid**, a work directed to every mujtahid as a necessary starting point that provides him with the basics of the science of difference, the principles of the various schools, and the philosophy of each school in legislation, and it is also a reference for every pragmatic researcher looking for legal solutions to his new practical situations. As for the specialist, it is a scientific effort representing the jurisprudential essence needed by every Muslim who wants his devotional and practical life to be in harmony with the rulings of the Law.

He followed a distinct path in the field of jurisprudence dominated by rational consideration (al-Irāqī, 1984, p. 43) and we say it is a distinct path, we do not mean that he was not in contact with other schools, for he was Maliki in school and encompassing of other schools, but despite this he created in this science from all sides and what confirms that is:

a) The statement of Ibn Rushd on the necessity of returning to the legal text (the Qur'an and the Sunnah): Ibn Rushd stipulated upon the jurist that he be knowledgeable of the legal text, as the text is the reference and the support upon which the jurist relies in deducing jurisprudential rulings, but this condition is not sufficient by itself, rather he also affirmed the necessity of knowledge of language and the diverse social and economic circumstances in society and being comprehending of the purposes of the law which aim to establish virtue and good for all humanity, here emerges the distinction of the philosopher-jurist or the jurist-philosopher in the field of jurisprudence, as he affirmed the necessity of adopting reason in reading the religious text, an exoteric and esoteric reading at the same time in order to reach the jurisprudential ruling that does not contradict the purposes and essence of religion.

And the importance of returning to the text lies in exceeding the mentality of imitation and jurisprudential guardianship and the trap of fragmenting the fragmented, i.e. explaining and analyzing the explanations of others and considering them as a fundamental reference despite that they are just a relative human production, he was clear and precise in determining the reference that must be returned to in the field of jurisprudence which is the original text, in order to avoid differences that lead to contradiction and inconsistency as well as unifying the reference so that the difference be in the branches not in the principles and in the language of the era between the fixed which is the text and the variable which is the human understanding.

b) The statement on the necessity of adopting the demonstrative approach (analysis and justification): The realistic rational reading of the text is a necessary cognitive condition that cannot be waived according to (Ibn Rushd), for the social and historical reading of the text opens the field before justified interpretation i.e. the justified, and thereby exceeding the style of narrating the opinions of jurists or the various schools which in their turn must be subjected to comparison for the sake of investigating truth and exceeding sectarian fanaticism, from here comes the necessity of adopting legal analogy which he sees as either being analogy of similarity or analogy of cause, as for adopting analogy of similarity, it makes jurisprudential rulings justified proceeding from the existence of a similarity between two cases, the first known and proven by text and the second unknown about which there is no explicit text.

Also analogy of cause is considered a demonstrative analogy because it is based on the logic of justification and reasoning either by returning to the text and the esoteric indication which is revealed by means of interpretation or returning to the social reality as well as the linguistic heritage with which the legal texts came (al-Thaqāfah, 1984, p. 330).

Indeed Ibn Rushd was unique in his demonstrative approach which is based on comparison, analysis, and reasoning, which requires mastery of the rational approach and commitment to legal texts, and this is what gave him the opportunity to establish the science of principles of jurisprudence which is still developing from one stage to another, and without doubt the Rushdian contribution in the field of jurisprudence is considered as a scientific revolution by which he declared the objectivity of the science of jurisprudence and its capacity for being rationalized, as he also made the framework or the orbit that governs this science is humanity, where he affirmed the necessity of linking the text to the reality of the human being and his interest so that he affirms that this science like the rest of other human sciences does not lose the characteristic of relativity and flexibility, in order to silence everyone who claims guardianship over the minds of Muslims ("Indeed the prescribed practical Sunan whose purpose is the psychic virtues, among them what pertains to magnifying whom must be thanked, and within this category fall acts of worship: and they are the Karāmiyyah Sunan, and among them what pertains to the virtue called chastity and these are two kinds: the Sunan pertaining to food and drink and the Sunan pertaining to interests. And among them what pertains to seeking justice and avoiding injustice, these are the kinds of Sunan that require justice in wealth and that require justice in bodies.... And cooperation upon these Sunan is what is called forbidding evil and enjoining good, and they are love and hate, i.e. the religious ones that are either due to violation of these Sunan or due to bad creed in the Law") (Rushd, 2005, p. 389), thereby he places the axiomatic conditions that must be adhered to when entering the world of jurisprudence and issuing fatwas; and they are all conditions that do not deviate from the text and the essence of the Law, and also do not exit from the temporal and spatial framework of the human being himself as he is the intended by the jurisprudential Law.

Indeed he placed these conditions through which can be understood the reason for the necessity of adopting reason according to a demonstrative approach represented in legal analogy, in which he created a status for the authority of the text and reason at the same time, an authority governed by realism and objectivity, represented as we indicated previously in language, reality, purposes and constants of the Law, and here emerges his originality in building the cognitive approach in the field of jurisprudence, and it is a cognitive approach; because it teaches people their religion and gives them the foundations upon which they can rely for understanding religion and practicing their daily life without feeling any embarrassment or fear of contradiction with the rulings of religion which is the religion of innate nature, as he also had the cognitive precedence to prove the possibility of rationalizing the science of principles of jurisprudence and developing it, and thereby he pulled the rug from under jurisprudential guardianship and sectarian hegemony and opened wide the field before organized human *ijtihad* founded on rigorous reason and sound understanding of the legal text, and the evidence of his commitment to this tendency is his contravening of the Maliki school* to which he belongs, where he dropped a principle from the principles of the Malikis which is taking the practice of the people of Medina because it is in his opinion a consensus of some i.e. a partial consensus and therefore not a valid proof (Labiyouid, 2001, p. 232), and here we find him exceeding fanaticism for any school and placing the jurisprudential schools on equal footing (Labiyouid, 2001, p. 232), and what granted Ibn Rushd these scientific qualities is the cognitive intellectual system which he laid down for himself firstly and also for everyone who wants to reach scientific truth whether in the field of the science of principles or any other science.

He adapted and accommodated the demonstrative approach and made it a cognitive mechanism that is not specialized in studying nature only, but rather it is a flexible mechanism that can be applied in all human cognitive concerns, and thereby he has surpassed in this epistemological work a contemporary epistemological problem represented in the scientificity and non-scientificity of human and religious studies.

Moreover, what he left for us of work in this field is considered a confirmation from him on the necessity of preserving difference and freedom of opinion on condition that it be scientifically and legally founded, as difference encourages *ijtihad* and research whether in deducing rulings or in establishing new scientific and legal rules and principles that can contribute in reading the religious text to understand it and deduce rulings that can make it easier for the Muslim to adhere to the Law and achieve his various worldly and otherworldly purposes without feeling a contradiction between the two purposes.

Alongside this he also affirmed the necessity of paying attention to differences (*al-khilāfiyyāt*) as a science standing by itself, due to what this science has of epistemological importance, for it is a science that documents the various jurisprudential tendencies and shows honestly and precisely the rules and principles that each jurisprudential tendency adopted in deducing legal rulings, and thereby gives the opportunity to everyone present and future to understand the various understandings and the nature of the justifications they adopted, this understanding which makes the process of returning to them or exceeding them a purely scientific process having no relation to sectarian fanaticism or weeping over ruins or arguing by freedom of thought and the development of life and its requirements in order to transfer those scientific efforts to the museum of history and the claim of founding a new jurisprudence that aligns with the scientific spirit of the age, for this is Ibn Rushd, with what he possesses of sciences in Law, philosophy and medicine, did not dare to say this opinion as he is convinced that he who throws behind his back everything that others produced and claims that he starts from nothing is in truth far from knowledge and reason, for knowledge is accumulative work even if it is based at the same time on rupture.

The relationship of the reconciliatory tendency with political and social life: I have indicated that the reconciliatory approach adopted by the Muslim philosophers from the Second Teacher to Ibn Rushd was not the goal in itself, for it was not aiming at reconciliation for the sake of reconciliation nor for the sake of affirming the total harmony between the two wise men - Plato and Aristotle - nor for the purpose of affirming the absolute similarity between philosophy as a human intellectual effort and religion of divine source. Rather the purpose was something else having a relation to the destiny of philosophy on one hand and the destiny of reason, will, and humanity on the other hand. As well as affirming the status of religion in the daily, and the importance of possessing a holistic view of the various intellectual and cultural components in society and what may arrive to it of ideas and cultures of others.

As for what concerns the destiny of philosophy, the philosophers wanted through their reconciliatory tendency to affirm that:

- **Difference in philosophy and in the sciences and between the jurisprudential and intellectual schools is a natural healthy condition:** and it does not mean contradiction and inconsistency, but rather it

carries difference and agreement at the same time, and thereby the difference that was between the two wise men becomes an apparent difference relating to the method that each one adopted in thinking and expressing his philosophical vision regarding the various philosophical problems that were being posed, and it is an apparent difference as it carries within it agreement in subject matter and end (al-Shammālī, 1979, p. 330) at the same time, which is human happiness, and thereby it becomes necessary to be occupied with what brings the philosophers together and not what separates them, especially since that difference can contribute to enriching human thought and alerting it to the various angles through which one can look at the single subject, and this is bound to broaden the horizon of vision for the human being if he rids himself of fear of philosophy and judging it as unbelief and error.

And the same applies to Ibn Rushd, who wanted through his reconciliatory approach, which we do not find only in determining the nature of the relationship between wisdom and Law, but rather also appears in his works related to the science of jurisprudence and legislation, where he opened up to the various jurisprudential schools despite being a Maliki, in order to affirm that this difference does not entail denying any school or being fanatical to it. For all schools are important in organizing legislative life, as the door of *ijtihād* remains open and cannot be closed under any argument. There is no final and single intellectual or scientific position. For reconciliation may become a social and intellectual necessity at the same time.

- **Highlighting the status of the human being in making reality and happiness:** As for the second aspect, it is related as I indicated to the status of human reason as well as human will in contributing effectively in building and organizing human life in its various aspects, its cognitive aspects as well as the social with its cultural and political dimension, as this tendency also contributes in determining the status and relationship of religion in organizing human life in various aspects especially the political and religious, "for the kingly craft from which the virtuous community is composed is under philosophy."

Thus the affirmation of the agreement existing between the philosophers on one hand and also between philosophy and religion is an affirmation from "al-Fārābī" and "Ibn Rushd" on the importance of human reason and its role in determining the destiny of the human being and achieving his happiness which is based on knowledge and action at the same time, and thereby this faculty becomes a role not to be underestimated in establishing the various theoretical systems and laws, as well as the practical plans to enable the human being to attain the virtuous community in which the happiness of individuals can be realized, as reason is "Indeed the reason by which the public says of the human being that he is rational, for the reference of what they mean by it is rationalization or good vision in deducing what he ought to do."

So if human reason is capable of enabling the human being to understand what surrounds him and to solve his various problems, this means that it is also capable of building a social political system capable of achieving happiness.

And thereby it becomes necessary to make room for the human being – the human creature – to perform his role in determining his destiny and organizing his life according to his aspirations and his surrounding civilizational circumstances.

For reconciliation between religion and philosophy is an affirmation that the human being can be creative in knowledge as well as in founding and organizing the human association, and in determining the nature of the laws that govern this society. As this reconciliation is also an affirmation of the importance of religion in the worldly and civil life of the human being, such that the human being's return to religion achieves his happiness and contributes to the emergence of a virtuous society, and thereby it is not permitted to use religion as a pretext for spreading sedition, injustice, and slavery among people. "Hence the integration of religion into philosophy and philosophy into religion meant breaking the Sunni siege and providing the natural education for establishing a more liberal relationship so that religion becomes indeed the religion of everyone – not a religion whose composition is a group against a group – and thus the state becomes the state of everyone" (al-Jābirī, 1993, p. 148). So if the reconciliatory tendency between religion and the state has several indications and dimensions, it can be said that the political dimension within it is like a central dimension, an essential angle through which this orientation must be viewed, which the philosophers were seeking through it to open wide the door before the individual to contribute in building the city capable of achieving happiness without restricting this goal in the hand of a clique or a specific group that uses religion as an argument and a pretext for their domination over the necks of people by tightening freedoms and considering opposing positions as a deviation from religion itself, and this is what neither "al-Fārābī" nor Ibn Rushd accepted.

So al-Fārābī sees that the state is in need of rationalization or the rational structuring of society and thought (al-Jābirī, 1993, p. 148), and thereby he has proclaimed a new ideology which he sees as qualified to solve the problems of his era, problems related to the human being's vision of the world, as well as his view of

his ability to determine his destiny and choose the rules and systems that govern the city in which he lives, and thereby the attainment of happiness is achieved which "is by the removal of evils from cities and from nations" (al-Fārābī, 1964, p. 84), and thus al-Fārābī made the reconciliatory position which is free from exclusion and fanaticism as well as curling in on the self or on the production of others as a solution capable and suitable for closing the doors before the forces of regression and contraction (al-Jābirī, 1993, p. 62), and thereby providing opportunities for progress and the involvement of all forces in the city to cooperate in providing all the material and moral conditions that make the city a means to achieve the happiness of everyone without exception or discrimination, a happiness conditioned by ethical, scientific, and intellectual controls linked to the rational understanding of the Law and also that which does not contradict the logic of reason or the innate nature of the human being.

The role of religion in founding political life:

When returning to the reconciliatory approach adopted by al-Fārābī as well as Ibn Rushd who returned to Plato despite being Aristotelian in tendency when he composed his essential work on politics, their concern becomes clear to highlight the status and the role allocated to religion in constructing the landmarks of the virtuous city, and this appears through their handling of the question of proving the existence of God and His attributes while affirming His oneness and ability to create; and this is to prove the possibility of the human reason through philosophy addressing these issues without that contradicting the creed – religion – and in this is an attempt from him to bring the human being closer to God Almighty and to elevate the human being to the kingdom of God, and thence to open the door before the possibility of realizing the kingdom of God on this earth, the earth of the human being and human association (al-Jābirī, 1993, p. 73). With this proposition, al-Fārābī opened the door to reconciliation between philosophy and the creed, and thereby affirming the importance of each of them in building the virtuous city, and thereby religion becomes like a shared reference among all the political and intellectual forces that can contribute in building the state ("From here those reconciliatory attempts between religion and philosophy, the attempts that were aiming to search for the bridge that connects the old forces with the new forces (al-Jābirī, 1993, p. 78)*, so that the dangers that threaten each of them might be avoided") (al-Jābirī, 1993, p. 78). But it must be noted that the affirmation of al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd of the status of religion in organizing the ethical, social, and political life in life was not at the expense of reason, for they did not make religion the sole center, but rather they gave a strong and central status to reason as a force that can contribute in the development of social consciousness by means of practicing interpretation of the religious text, a sensitive task carried out by the ruler who must present the necessary interpretations of the symbols in religion to make room for building the state of reason and civilizational development, and this is something that religion itself does not oppose. Here al-Fārābī has presented an intellectual political project in which he does not negate philosophy nor does he diminish the role of religion as a solid ground that can be relied upon in building the city and establishing its legal, cultural, and political landmarks.

Conclusion:

The theories of Ibn Rushd and al-Fārābī in reconciliatory philosophy are an example of genius and distinction in the history of medieval philosophy, as they were able to extract the texts of the historical, epistemological, and cultural contexts that imprinted the intellectual environment of Muslims, during the debate of reason with tradition, and the debate of politics with ethics. And the two philosophers demonstrated the capacity and value of Islamic rationalism in establishing the landmarks of the progressive dynamism of intellectual and methodological activities, as it was adopted within their logical systematic frameworks, matching the peculiarity of Islamic cultural production, taking as reference the life reference of Muslims (the Noble Qur'an and the Noble Prophetic Sunnah). There is no doubt that the reconciliatory tendency of the two Muslim sages was intended to put an end to sterile conflicts and debates between philosophers and intellectuals, and to achieve the dignified rational openness by which the human being realizes the paths of happiness and success in this world and the hereafter.

In sum, we can extract the most important inputs of the reconciliatory theory of al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd by limiting the requirements of the collective tendency in the following:

- 1- Exonerating Islamic philosophical thought from Westernizing skepticism, as no referential rooting has been attained for it.
- 2- Considering what was transmitted from the Greeks as an explanation of the requirements of philosophical theories, and a definition of the justifications for adopting some of them.

3- The novelty of the proposition and the distinction of its discourse in the theory of reason and tradition contrary to what Christian thought presented.

4- Reconciliation according to its Islamic requirement has as its purpose the happiness of the human being, and the achievement of comprehensive visions of the issues of the universe and the human being.

Exonerating Islamic rationalism (the philosophies of Ibn Rushd and al-Fārābī) from any imitation or following of Greek thought in its references, foundations, and elements, and considering this newcomer as a complementary tributary to the purposes of Islamic thought.

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