CYBERSECURITY OF IoT DEVICES IN THE INTERNAL NETWORKS OF MILITARY UNITS AND ORGANIZATIONS

Abstract

The digital transformation of the defense sector has expanded the use of Internet of Things devices in the internal networks of military units and organizations. These devices include IP cameras, access-control systems, biometric equipment, smart displays, multifunction printers, conferencing systems, building-management systems, environmental sensors, and smart meters. They improve operational efficiency, monitoring, and automation, but they also enlarge the cyberattack surface because of weak credentials, outdated software, vendor-managed cloud services, automatic device-discovery protocols, limited logging, and long service lifecycles. In a military organization, the consequences extend beyond the loss of information confidentiality. A compromised device may disclose the location and layout of facilities, security routines, personnel movements, and logistics patterns; provide a foothold for lateral movement within the internal network; and ultimately disrupt mission continuity.

This study identifies the principal attack surfaces, threats, and vulnerabilities associated with IoT devices in military internal networks and develops a mission-oriented risk-assessment method and a security model based on zero-trust principles. The research comparatively examines Mongolian cybersecurity legislation and authoritative sources, including NIST CSF 2.0, NISTIR 8259A, NIST SP 800-213, NIST SP 800-207, NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, ETSI EN 303 645, and MITRE ATT&CK. The findings show that military IoT risk is not confined to technical vulnerabilities at the device level. It also arises from incomplete asset inventories, flat network architectures, uncontrolled vendor remote access, cloud dependency, and weak lifecycle governance. The study proposes a five-zone network architecture, evidence-based risk assessment, and integrated security measures covering the entire lifecycle from procurement to disposal.